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UNHAPPY MASSES AND THE CHALLENGE OF POLITICAL ISLAM
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IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
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By: Prof. Said S. Samatar
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I'd like to
start, if I
may, with a
personal
confession:
my friend
and fellow
alumnus of
Northwestern
University ,
Professor
Alessandro
Triulzi,
has, by
flying me
across the
Atlantic ,
made a
considerable
investment
in me.
Although he
surely will
not get his
money's
worth out of
me, that
fact does
not weigh
heavily on
my mind.
More than
this, thanks
to Bin Laden
and Co., the
ghost of
political
Islam has
lately drawn
academic
attention to
my
professional
interests
and, in
doing so,
has turned
out to be my
premiere
meal ticket,
a manna from
heaven to
ensure
earthly
prosperity.
Somalia is
once again,
as indeed is
the Sudan ,
the object
of attention
by the West.
The
once-neglected
villages of
Somalia are,
as we speak,
crawling
with CIA
agents,
looking for
the elusive
specter of
Bin Laden
hideouts,
presumably
in the
bushes and
in the
grazing
grounds of
camel herds.
I am loath
not to
welcome this
development,
if only for
the enormous
employment
opportunities
it has
opened up
for us, the
Somali
elite, as
well as
expatriate
fellow
travelers.
Who needs,
from now on,
to trouble
with the
teaching of
complacent,
overfed,
gum-chewing
American
undergrads
when the CIA
pays
better--and
with far
less
exertion of
the mind as
of the body.
As regards
the subject
of Islam in
Somalia : it
could be
said that
Islam may
well have
come to the
Horn of
Africa
before the
new religion
flourished
in Arabian
soil. Some
years before
the Prophet
Muhammad's
(may peace
be upon him)
flight from
Mecca in
622, a party
of more than
seventy
Muslim
converts
fled fearful
persecution
in Mecca to
seek refuge
in the
Christian
court of the
Abyssinian
king in
Axum(Axum is
today in the
province of
Tigrai in
Ethiopia).
Astonishingly--and
mysteriously--the
king
promptly
gave
sanctuary to
the fleeing
Muslims. The
pagan chiefs
of Mecca
gave chase
and demanded
the
immediate
surrender of
the Muslim
refugees,
but the king
adamantly
refused to
hand them
over. In
doing so, he
risked doing
an
irreparable
damage to
the cordial
relations in
trade and
goodwill
between the
two Red Sea
neighbors.
When the
Prophet
Muhammad (PBUH)
returned to
Mecca in a
triumphal
march eight
years later,
most of the
Muslims came
back, but
the record
does not
make it
clear
whether, in
fact, they
all did
return.
Might some
have
remained
behind to
plant the
seed of the
new religion
in the soil
of the Horn?
Historians
still puzzle
over the
incredible
show of
humanity to
the
persecuted
Muslims on
the part of
the
Abyssinian
sovereign.
In any case,
his
generosity
was not lost
on the
Prophet who
laid it down
in a Hadith
(the Hadith
contains the
sayings and
deeds of the
prophet and,
as such,
constitutes
the second
most sacred
text of
Islam, after
the Qur'an)
that “
Abyssinia is
a land of
justice in
which nobody
is
oppressed.”
The point
was
unmistakable:
no jihad
against
Abyssinia ,
a prophetic
injunction
that the
Muslims seem
to have
taken to
heart. It is
a fact, in
any case,
that in the
early
energetic
centuries of
Islam when
the empires
of the
Persians and
Byzantines
fell like a
house of
cards before
the steady
onslaught of
victorious
Muslim
armies,
Abyssinia
was left
alone
unmolested.
Some
historians
claim that
the
forbidding
landscape of
Abyssinia
coupled with
the martial
spirit of
this warrior
nation saved
it from
Muslim
invasion. In
my view, the
Hadithal
injunction
of no jihad
against
Abyssinia
does more to
explain the
survival of
Abyssinian
Christianity
in the age
of Islamic
eruption on
the global
scene. This
was of
course to
change
later,
especially
in the
sixteenth
century with
the
devastating
invasions of
Abyssinia by
the Muslim
Ghazi, or
holy
warrior,
Ahmad
al-Ghazi,
better known
by the less
flattering
Abyssinian
appellation
of Ahmad
Gragne, or
the
Left-Handed.
But even
here it is
worth to
recall that
the outbreak
of hostility
between
Muslims and
Ethiopian
Christianity
stemmed from
the threat
felt by the
Muslims of
an
expansionist,
re-energized
Christian
empire
steadily--and
inexorably--pushing
eastwards
towards the
Muslim
lowlands.
Equally
interesting
to note is
the fact
that
Muhammad was
apparently
familiar
with Ge'ez,
the ancient
tongue of
Abyssinia ,
and the
liturgical
language of
the
Ethiopian
Church
today, from
the
appearance
in the text
of the
Qur'an of
Ge'ez words
like Neguz,
or King. As
well, the
word for God
(Waaq) in
the Cushitic
languages of
Oromo and
Somali
appears in
the Qur'an.
Was Muhammad
familiar
with these
Cushitic
languages,
too?
Also–-and
this Somalis
would not be
delighted to
hear--the
word
“Somali”
shows up,
for the
first time
in written
form, in the
royal
chronicles
of the
Abyssinian
Neguz Yeshaq,
as one of
the peoples
reduced by
him in a
recent
campaign.
Whatever the
origins of
the spread
of Islam in
the Horn,
Somalia was
thoroughly
Islamized by
the
fourteenth
century, as
we learn
from the
very helpful
account of
the
globe-trotting
Muslim
scholar, Ibn
Battuta. To
compare
briefly the
influence
and
distribution
of Islam in
the
countries of
the Horn of
Africa:
Professor
Paulos
Milkias of
Concordia
University
(Montreal,
Canada) has
recently
come up with
some
startling,
if not
explosive,
revelations
showing the
Somali
population
of Ethiopia
to
constitute
the third
largest
ethnic group
in the
country,
after the
Oromo and
Amhara. The
Woyane(popular
name for the
Tigreans in
power in
Ethiopia
today) come
fourth. If
so, Islam
may form a
numerical
majority in
Ethiopia ,
but power
and
privilege
being
dominated by
the
Christians,
Muslims
remain a
sociological
minority in
the land.
Sudan , I
take it, is
both
numerically
and
sociologically
Muslim,
while
Somalia is
almost 100%
Islamic.
Militant
Islam is
highly
unlikely to
cause any
political
mischief in
Somalia ,
for reasons
to be
offered
shortly. Be
that as it
may, the
overwhelming
majority of
the Somalis
are sunnis,
adhering to
the Shafi'i
school of
Islamic
jurisprudence,
and
tenuously
belong to
Sufi
brotherhoods.
The
religious
brotherhoods
in Somalia
include the
Qaadiriya,
the earliest
and the
claimer of
the largest
number of
adherents.
The
Qaadiriya
traces its
founding and
spiritual
efficacy to
the twelfth
century
Baghdadi
saint,
Abdul-Qadir
al-Jilani.
Then there
is the
Ahmadiya,
founded by
the
nineteenth
century
Moroccan
mystic and
teacher,
Ahmad b.
Idris,
al-Fassi.
Finally, the
Saalihiya,
an off-shoot
of Ahmadiya,
established
by the
Sudanese
student of
al-Fassi's,
Muhammad
Salih from
Dongola on
the Nile .
It may be
recalled
that the
Somali poet,
mystic and
warrior, who
led the
famous and
earth-consuming
insurrection
against
British,
Italian and
Ethiopian
rule, the
Sayyid
Muhammad
Abdullah
Hasan, il
Mullah Pazzo
of the
Italians,
and the Mad
Mullah of
British
colonial
literature,
was a
follower of
Muhammad
Salih.
At first
glance
Somalia
would appear
to be an
ideal
breeding
ground for
the rise of
a
large-scale,
grassroots
fundamentalist
movement:
For one
thing,
Somali Islam
is a
frontier
Islam,
hemmed in on
all sides by
pagan and
Christian
interlopers.
Characteristically,
frontier
Islam is
bellicose,
xenophobic
and
profoundly
suspicious
of alien
influences.
This
together
with the
fact that
Somalia 's
masses are
perennially
haunted by
the specter
of famine
and anarchy,
war,
devastation,
and other
horrors
should make
it an
excellent
candidate
for a
resurgent
militant
Islam. But
the Somalis
defy the
laws of
political
science.
In spite of
the presence
of all the
conditions
that should
unleash
cataclysmic
upheavals in
Somalia ,
nothing of
the sort has
happened
there, or is
likely to
happen. What
explains
this bizarre
defiance of
anthropological
theory?
Simply put,
the patterns
of Somali
social
organization,
or
disorganization,
provide a
most
satisfactory
if
disheartening
explanation.
(Disheartening
especially
today, it
may be
added, in
light of the
terror and
trepidations
wrought on
Somalia by
the jackals
gyrating
back and
forth
between
Nairobi and
Mogadishu,
who have
grown fat on
the loot of
the broken
body politic
of this
unhappy
country,
thus
perpetuating
Somalia's
agony for
booty.) To
return to
the point,
the Somali
polity is
shaped by a
single,
central
principle
that
overrides
all others,
namely the
phenomenon
that social
anthropologists
call “the
segmentary
lineage
system.”
Enrico
Cerulli,
that
Olympian
Italian
scholar to
whom all
Somalists–and
I might say
Ethiopianists,
too--are
forever
indebted,
has first
drawn
attention to
the salience
of
segmentation
in Somali
society. And
I. M. Lewis
has later
constructed
a definitive
study of the
workings of
this
principle in
A Pastoral
Democracy ,
still
deservedly
judged the
classic
study of
Somali
pastoralism.
Stripped of
the
scientific
razzle-dazzle
with which
it is often
presented,
segmentation
may be
expressed in
the Arab
Bedouin
saying: “my
uterine
brother and
I against my
half
brother, my
brother and
I against my
father, my
father's
household
against my
uncle's
household,
our two
households
(my father's
and uncle's)
against the
rest of the
immediate
kin, the
immediate
kin against
non-immediate
members of
my clan, my
clan against
other clans
and,
finally, my
nation and I
against the
world! In
lineage
segmentation
one,
literally,
does not
have a
permanent
enemy or a
permanent
friend–not
even a
permanent
Muslim
friend–but
only a
permanent
attention to
the
availability
of
self-improving
opportunities.
Depending on
a given
context, a
man–or a
group of
men, or a
state, for
that
matter–may
be your
friend or
foe.
Everything
is fluid and
ever-changing.
Moreover,
sad to say,
experience
seems to
show the
Somalis as
utterly
lacking the
notion,
basic to
human
decency, of
fixed
loyalty--loyalty
to anything
high or low,
sacred or
secular, and
that, on the
contrary,
the
principle of
greedy,
galloping
personal
gain tends
to over-ride
all else
among us
Somalis.
Worse still,
the concept
of personal
responsibility
or political
accountability
seems to be
thoroughly
missing from
the Somali
weltanschauung,
or
worldview;
and
therefore
there is no
social
mechanism in
our culture
to serve as
a check on
an
individual's—or
a
group's--rapacious
excesses or
to restrain
malcontents
from
wreaking
havoc on a
helpless
bovine
populace.
Thus,
yesterday's
mass
murderers
and the
day-before-yesterday's
thuggish
looters of
the nation's
resources
put
themselves
forward as
today's
leaders of
the Somali
people's
destiny. And
nobody calls
them on it
because they
are
protected on
all sides by
their kin.
Furthermore,
it is indeed
a depressing
thought to
observe that
a Somali
crook's
kinsmen
seldom ask
themselves
what
interest
accrue to
them
collectively
from
protecting
an
extortionist
thug who
ruthlessly
exploits
them by
killing and
stealing in
their name
without even
sharing the
loot with
them! I
could name
names and
cite
examples of
the above
but will
refrain from
doing so for
reasons of
charity,
perhaps of
self-interest—ergo,
I, too,
being a
Somali must
utter these
remarks with
an eye to
self-interest!
(Remember
the
venerable
Somali
aphorism:
Shiikh
tolkiis kama
janna tego!)
No wonder we
have come to
acquire a
global
reputation
as a nation
of victims
and
criminals.
Segmentation,
in other
words, is a
social
system that
results in,
and
sanctions,
institutional
instability
as a
cultural
norm. Thus
it may be
stated as a
general
rule,
without
hesitation
or
heart-searching,
that
instability
as a way of
life informs
the Somali
world!
Shaped thus
by the weird
quirks of
lineage
segmentation,
the Somalis,
as a
society, are
segmental,
warlike,
schismatic,
and
extremely
addicted to
self-based
pragmatism,
at least as
they
understand
pragmatism.
What is in
it for me? a
Somali is
likely to
ask on any
given issue.
In view of
the rigorous
exigencies
of the
Somali
environment,
a Somali is
invariably
predisposed
to look out
for numero
uno.
Therefore
the ideology
of
self-sacrifice
essential
for the rise
of a great
grassroots
movement is
alien to his
psyche. No
Somali, for
example,
will ever
blow himself
up for the
cause of
al-Islam. A
classic
Somali adage
holds that “
Ilaah iyo
‘Atoosh baa
nego
degaallamaya,
dhankii
‘Atoosh
baannuna u
liicaynaa:
once upon a
time, Allah
and a
warrior
chieftain
named
‘Atoosh
began to
wage a
terrific
fight over
us(Somalis),
and we
forthwith
went with
the chief
against
Allah,
because the
chief could
deliver the
goods faster
than Allah.”
That is, a
Somali would
promptly go
against the
law of
Allah, if
doing so
turns out to
be in his
material
interest. (I
do
appreciate
that in
making these
remarks, I
am painting
my
countrymen
as a bunch
of
unprincipled
opportunists).
Well, the
Somali
environment
does tend to
produce a
pragmatic
worldview!
And that
pragmatic
desert
worldview
militates
against the
growth of
organized,
Islamic
militancy
or, for that
matter,
large scale
movement of
any sort.
Arguably,
the Sayyid
Muhammad,
the George
Washington
of Somali
nationalism
and the
Dante
Alighieri of
Somali
literature,
did succeed
in leading a
rather
drawn-out,
grassroots
resistance
against the
combined
powers of
Britain,
Italy and
Ethiopia(1898-1920).
And yet his
movement
killed an
estimated
one million
Somalis and
precious few
infidels. As
the Italian
Consul in
Aden,
cavalliere
Pestalozza,
the only
European to
set eyes on
the elusive
mullah,
reminds us,
the Sayyid's
movement,
having
miserably
failed to
unify
Somalis
against
infidel
rule,
deteriorated
into a
destructive
civil war.
The same
headache
confronts
the
hyena-thugs
fighting
over the
decomposed
body of the
Somali
polity
today. It is
a great
misconception
to call
these
free-lance
looters
warlords, at
least in the
sense
Westerners
understand
the term. In
Western
political
discourse a
warlord is a
figure who
can bring a
unified
horde of
followers
either to
the battle
field or to
the
negotiating
table. To be
sure, a
Somali
“warlord”
may manage
to field a
hundred men
into a
concerted
action, if
the
perceived
interests of
the clan as
a whole are
threatened,
or the
prospects of
a lucrative
booty look
good. But as
soon as the
organizing
emergency
evaporates,
each man
goes his
merry way,
unfettered
by any
binding
loyalty to a
transcendent
cause.
How the
Italians
managed to
impose a
semblance of
order on the
Somalis for
eighty years
remains a
matter for
astonishment--no
doubt by
methods that
would be
considered
extraordinary
in this
human-rights-sensitive
age.
Italians,
please, do
come and
re-colonize
us again.
The
long-necked
Somali
lasses are
there, still
waiting for
you. (Mama
mia, come
dolce,
Khadija!”)
On a serious
note: while
the British
neglected
British
Somaliland
by merely
using it as
Aden's
“butcher
shop,”(a
supplier of
meat to
their Aden
garrison),
British
development
energies
being spent
in nearby
Kenya, the
Italians, by
contrast,
made a
serious
attempt to
develop and
modernize
Italian
Somalia.
They created
the vast
banana
plantations
and
varieties of
citrus
fruits that
in time came
to
constitute
Somalia's
leading
export
earner. To
this day
Somali
bananas
remain the
wonder of
culinary
connoisseurs.
Then why,
one should
duly ask,
does
Somaliland
republic
enjoy a
semblance of
peace and
stability
that has
eluded
Italian
Somalia? The
answer is as
simple as it
is
discouraging:
Ex-Italian
Somalia is
too changed
to leave an
effective
role for the
traditional
institutions
of elders
and shirka,
or assembly,
debates and
too
unchanged to
accommodate
modern
methods of
governance.
She is stuck
in a limbo,
between the
rock of
pre-industrial
outlook and
attitudes on
the one hand
and the hard
place of
half-baked
modernization
on the
other.
To return to
the subject
of political
Islam in
Somalia,
segmentation
has
forbidden
the
emergence of
a creditable
Islamic
fundamentalist
force to
make a bid
for
political
power. There
was one
notable
exception:
in the early
1990s, the
shadowy,
toothless
entity known
as
al-Itihaad
attempted to
seize power
in Puntland,
with a view
to
establishing
a theocratic
regime in
that region.
Warlord
Abdullahi
Yuusuf
(today's
putative
president of
Somalia), a
leathery
survivor of
innumerable
gun fights
and
therefore
not
particularly
noted for
mildness of
character,
unleashed
his militia
on the holy
warriors in
a fearful
massacre,
driving the
mullahs out
into the
wilderness
and
mercilessly
hunting them
down in
their
mountain
hideouts.
Inexplicably,
the
desperate
pleas of
God's
soldiers for
divine
intervention
in the face
of
Abdullahi's
fury was
completely
ignored by
the Almighty
who
indifferently
looked the
other way as
the
self-styled
holy men
were
systematically
obliterated.
The hapless
remnants of
al-Itihaad
have fled
westwards to
the region
of Luuq
Ferrandi on
the
Somali-Ethiopian
border.
Their
bogey-man
presence in
that
sensitive
border area
has turned
out to be a
gift from
heaven for
the
once-beleaguered
(but now
strengthened
, thanks to
al-Itihaad)
regime of
Meles
Zennawi in
Ethiopia.
The wily
Zennawi has
used (and
continues to
use) the
perceived
threat of
al-Itihaad
as an
effective
weapon to
milk the
fundamentalist-paranoid
American
cash cow.
Despite the
fact that
the Somali
social
fabric cuts
against the
growth of a
fundamentalist
movement,
the Pentagon
and State
Department
bureaucrats
insist on a
Bin Laden
presence in
Somalia. To
settle the
matter once
and for all,
I asked my
colleague
Sunni
Khalid, of
the Voice of
America, to
host an
on-the-air
panel to
discuss the
issue. The
panelist who
represented
the American
government
view, whom I
suspected to
be a CIA
spook,
fiercely
contended
that there
were Bin
Laden camps
in Somalia.
And when
pressed to
name one
camp, he
began to
fudge
ambiguously.
Finally, the
moderator of
the panel, a
Senegalese
journalist,
apparently
acting on a
whisper from
him, named
Ras Kamboni,
south of
Kismayu on
the Indian
Ocean as a
Bin Laden
stronghold.
After the
panel ended,
perplexed
and
embarrassed
over the
possibility
that this
panelist
might know
something I
did not, I
phoned a
colleague in
the field to
check it
out.
He journeyed
to Ras
Kamboni and
found there
a single
one-eyed
mullah and
three Bantu
followers!
Some
stronghold!
Bin Laden
knows better
than to
trust his
person or
that of his
lieutenants
to the
individualistic
environment
of the
Somalis
where
everything
is open and
without
secrecy, and
where
opportunism
and the
numero uno
outlook of
personal
survival
form the
prevailing
traits.
Therefore,
where
Somalia is
concerned,
the West has
nothing to
fear with
respect to
the upsurge
of militant
Islam. The
Islamic
history of
the Sudan
tells a
different
story.
Though I am
ill-equipped
to speak to
Sudanese
Islam, the
obvious can
be stated:
the Sudan
tends to
spawn
messianic
characters
en masse,
the great
Mahdi near
the end of
the
nineteenth
century
being the
prime
example, but
there also
having
flourished a
legion of
small-time
mahdis,
Nebbi ‘Issas
, Nebbi
Khadhar s,
Nebbi this,
Nebbi that,
Nebbi the
other.
Now I have a
theory as to
why the
Sudan tends
to be a
breeding
ground for
messianic
figures,
which I want
to try out
on the
Sudanese
scholars at
this
conference.
My wildly
speculative
view holds
that the
Sudan
represents a
dramatic
clash
between
African
Ju-Ju(for
those
unfamiliar
with this
term, Ju-Ju
is an
all-purpose
word
throughout
black Africa
for magic,
witchcraft,
sorcery and
related
para-normal
phenomena)
and Semitic
mysticism.
When the
mind of the
witch doctor
fuses with
that of the
Sufi, or
Muslim
mystic, the
result can
be a
powerful
mental
detonation
that ignites
into
existence a
multitude of
messiahs.
Though
Somalia per
se is
unlikely to
serve as a
fertile soil
for Islamic
fundamentalism,
it may be
caught up in
a global
Islamic
revolutionary
upheaval.
Muslims are
assured in
the Qur'an:
“you are the
noblest
community
ever raised
for
mankind.”
Yet sober
Muslims
surely must
wonder
whether
their
present-day
reality-–downtrodden
masses,
ignorance,
rigid
backward
looking
interpretation
of the
tenets of
their faith,
a degrading
defeat after
defeat at
the hands of
Christian
Westerners
and Jews,
complete
loss of
their
onced-fabled
lead in
science and
philosophy–justifies
their view
of
themselves
as a noble
community.
In short,
Muslims are
a people
with a
magnificent
past and a
humiliating
present. In
particular,
the last two
centuries
have not
been kind to
the ummah,
or the
Islamic
universal
community of
faith, as
the Muslims
watched
helplessly
the steady
erosion of
their
position
versus the
dynamic,
secular
resurgent
West. No
matter how
one looks at
it, the
heart of the
Muslim
dilemma goes
to a problem
that the
Reformation
and the
enlightenment
movement
have
permanently
solved for
Westerners,
notably the
question of
what should
be the basis
for social
and economic
development
in the
community:
human reason
or revealed
faith?
Westerners
have
effectively,
and for
good,
settled that
question by
the
well-known
principle of
the
separation
of Church
and state.
It took
Europeans
three
hundred
years of
blood and
tears to
transform
themselves
from a
faith-driven
worldview to
secularized,
reason-driven
socio-economic
systems.
Will Muslims
undertake
the painful
reform of
society, and
even more
painful
re-interpretation
of their
faith to
bring
Islamic
theory and
practice in
accordance
with the
dictates of
the modern
world? Will
there ever
arise a
Muslim
Voltaire or
a Muslim
Ernest Renan
to declare
war on the
body of
hidebound
conservative
Muslim
jurists
whose
narrow,
rigid,
literalist
interpretation
of the
Qur'an and
Hadith, have
sunk the
Muslim
community
into the
ground?
I will offer
one
remarkable
example:
everyone at
this
symposium,
whether of
Muslim or
Christian
heritage,
takes it as
a given of
the Muslim's
God-given
right to
take four
wives. In
fact the
scriptural
pronouncements
on the
matter are
found in two
references
in the
fourth
chapter of
the Qur'an
entitled,
the Women's
chapter. In
that
chapter, the
whole range
of the
rights and
obligations
of women in
the Muslim
community
are spelled
out. The
first
reference
appears in
verses 1, 2,
and 3: it
reads: that
Muslim men
are allowed
to marry
two, three
or four
wives. But
Muslim men
choose to
forget the
second part
of the
Qur'anic
injunction,
which reads:
But if you
fear that
you cannot
administer
absolute
justice
among your
wives, then
you are
commanded to
take only
one wife; a
few
paragraphs
later, the
same chapter
lays down
that “you,
men, with
your human
short
comings,
will never,
ever, be
able to
administer
justice
among your
wives.” What
inference
can be drawn
from this?
Umistakably,
monogamy.
Yet, Muslims
throughout
history have
chosen to
embrace the
first of the
Qur'anic
instructions
and to
ignore the
second,
obviously
because
Muslim women
have never
had a say
about the
interpretation
of the
Qur'an. In
any case,
the
prophet's
permission
for his
disciples to
take four
wives
stemmed more
from a
sociological
reason than
religious.
As a warrior
community,
the Muslims
were
perennially
fighting,
and too many
married men
were falling
in battle.
As a result,
the prophet
was
confronted
with the
nightmare of
multitudes
of young
widows with
children
clamoring
for support,
whereupon he
sensibly
cleared the
way for
plural
marriages.
In the heart
of Islam in
Saudi
Arabia, no
woman is
allowed to
venture out
of the house
without the
Hijaab, or
the
notorious
black veil.
To my
knowledge,
nowhere do
you find the
imposition
of veils on
women in the
early Muslim
community.
All that the
Qur'an
decrees is
for women to
dress
modestly, as
indeed
Christian
women are
also
commanded.
In fact the
practice of
covering
does not
even figure
in early
Arab
culture.
Covering as
a cultural
practice
originates
as a Persian
custom and
only becomes
a widespread
Islamic
practice
centuries
later, with
the
incorporation
of Persia
into the
Muslim
world.
What about
the issue of
dissent
based on
individual
conscience?
Again, the
Reformation
has settled
this matter
in the West.
By contrast,
to my
knowledge,
there is no
room for
individual
disagreement
based on
one's
conscience
in the
Islamic
world. The
example of
Sheikh M. M.
Taha is
sadly
instructive
here. Taha,
a Sudanese
national, a
great Muslim
scholar and
one of the
most
original
minds of the
twentieth
century in
the Muslim
world, was
executed in
1983 by
Jaafar
al-Nimeiry,
former
dictator of
the Sudan,
on grounds
of religious
heresy.
Sheikh
Taha's sin:
he ventured
to offer the
opinion that
it was not
necessary to
pray 5 times
a day, and
that the
love of God
in the heart
overrides
these
anachronistic
daily
rituals.
Rituals were
meant, said
he, for
Bedouin
tribes some
fourteen
centuries
ago. For the
record, I
disagree
with Taha,
as I firmly
hold the
opinion that
rituals are
essential
for the
endurance of
religion.
Look at the
Catholics
and Jews.
But was this
enough to
hang the
greatest
mind in the
land? When
was the last
Westerner to
be executed
for
religious
heresy? I
bet none,
since
Savonarola
was burned
at the stake
by the
Borgia Pope,
Alexander VI
in the
fifteenth
century.
Nimeiry
asked Sheikh
Taha to
recant.
Recant? That
word
vanished
from
European
vocabulary
with the
Reformation.
And Sheikh
Taha's
passion on
the way to
the hanging
Tower still
resonates,
every bit as
passionately,
dramatically
and
pathetically
as that of
Christ on
the way to
Calvary.
What about
the humane
tolerance of
peoples of
other faiths
that was the
hallmark of
the
classical
age of
Islam? Here,
in Rome, the
heart of
Christianity,
Muslims are
completely
at liberty
to construct
Mosques and
other houses
of worship
with
complete
religious
freedom.
Would the
heart of
Islam,
namely,
Saudi
Arabia,
return the
courtesy by
allowing
Christians
to build
churches in
Mecca and
Medina!? Is
it not time
for Muslims
to engage in
a painful,
collective
self-examination?
Too often we
hear the
litany of
exhortations
calling upon
the West to
understand
Islam. That
is putting
the question
upside down.
Westerners
need no new
understanding
of Muslims,
they already
do
understand
Islam and
Muslims
exceptionally
well. Every
university
worthy of
the name in
Europe and
America has
a department
of Islamic
studies. My
colleague
here,
Alessandro,
is a leading
faculty
member of an
entire
institution
that does
nothing but
specialize
in studying
Islam and
Muslims. Can
one locate a
single
university
offering
advanced
degrees on
Western
civilization
in any
Muslim
country,
perhaps with
the possible
exception of
Turkey and
Egypt? So,
to put the
issue of
understanding
right side
up, it is of
pressing
urgency for
Muslims to
understand
Europeans
and their
heritage.
In short,
blind
conservatism
has
imprisoned
the mind of
Muslims.
Smugly
comfortable
in our
untroubled
ignorance,
we Muslims
want to
sleep in
complacent
indolence.
But
Westerners
would not
let us
sleep. They
keep on
kicking us
in the
backside, in
order to
give us a
rude
awakening.
Will Muslims
do
it-–undergo
the
agonizing
pains of
reform in
order to
transform
their
societies to
a
competitive
level? Here
a troubling
question
obtrudes:
why isn't
there a
single
democratic
country in
the Muslim
world?
Turkey?–well,
a democracy
of sorts?
Why does
democracy
work in
India, and
not in
Pakistan?
The two
countries
are about
the same
level of
technical
and economic
development.
In fact,
were it not
for the
religious
factor,
Pakistan and
India would
be
practically
indistinguishable.
Then why
does
democracy
work in the
one, and not
in the
other? Is
there
something
about
Islamic
culture, at
least as it
is practiced
today, that
is
fundamentally
and
inherently
anti-democratic?
All too
often
Muslims do
not ask
these
questions,
and when
they do, do
not make
them
actionable.
If so–-and
in the
absence of
urgent
reforms--Muslims
are likely
to continue
to chafe
under the
oppressive
heel of
secularized,
highly
skilled
Western
barbarians.
And they
will fall
further and
further
behind the
West in
science and
technology,
and
therefore in
economic and
political
well being
Then the
unhappy,
hungry
masses of
Islam from
Nigeria to
Indonesia
are likely
to rise in a
massive
insurrection,
which will
no doubt
result in
cataclysmic
social
upheavals
that are
likely to
throw up a
million Bin
Ladens to
the
forefront.
Then the
West will
see a kind
of rage and
terror that
is bound to
make the
present
disturbances
look like a
child's play |
